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1. INTRODUCTION
During the grant reporting period, the research carried out has involved the development of
the technique known as data diversity. Data diversity relies on a different form of redundancy
from existing approaches to software fault tolerance and is substantially less expensive to
implement. Data diversity can also be applied to software testing and greatly facilitates the
automation of testing. Up to now, it had been explored both theoretically and in a pilot study,
and had been shown to be a promising technique. We have continued to develop data diversity in
various areas under this grant. The basic concepts of data diversity and its relation to other
techniques are presented in section 1 of this report. Previous work and basic concepts are
reviewed in section 2. The results obtained under this grant are presented in two self-contained
papers that are included in this report as appendices.
Various methods for making software that is fault-tolerant have been proposed in an effort
to provide substantial improvements in the reliability of software for safety-critical applications.
At execution time, the fault-tolerant structure attempts to cope with the effect of those faults that
have survived the development process. The two best-known methods of building fault-tolerant
software are N-version programming [3] and recovery blocks [7]. To tolerate faults, both of these
techniques rely on design diversity, i.e., the availability of multiple implementations of a
specification. Software engineers assume that the different implementations use different designs
and thereby, it is hoped, contain different faults.
N-version programming requires the separate, independent preparation of multiple (i.e.
"N") versions of a program for some application. These versions are usually executed in parallel
in the application environment; each receives identical inputs, and each produces its version of
the required outputs. A decision function collects the outputs and selects the system's output
from them.
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The recovery block structure submits the results of an algorithm to an acceptance test. If
the results fail the test, the system restores the state of the machine that existed just prior to
execution of the algorithm and executes an alternate algorithm. The system repeats this process
until it exhausts the set of alternates or produces a satisfactory output.
It is well known that software often fails for special cases in the data space t. In practice, a
program may survive extensive testing, work for many cases, and then fail on a special case. The
special case may take the form of what seems to be an obscure set of values in the data. Testing
frequently fails to reveal faults associated with special cases precisely because the test harness
does not generate the exact circumstances required. A test data set whose values are merely close
to the values that cause the program to fail does not uncover the fault.
These observations suggest that if software fails under a particular set of execution
conditions, a minor perturbation of those execution conditions might allow the software to work.
Other researchers have exploited this property in specific instances. Gray observed that certain
faults that caused failure in an asynchronous commercial system did not always cause failure if
the same inputs were submitted to a second execution [5]. The system succeeded on the second
execution due to a chance reordering of the asynchronous events. Gray introduced the term
"Heisenbugs" to describe these faults and their apparent non-deterministic manifestations.
Morris has proposed "temporal separation" of the input data to a dual version system [6].
The versions use data from adjacent real-time frames rather than the same frame. Since the
versions read sensor data at different times, the data tend to differ. The system corrects for this
discrepancy so that it can vote on the outputs of the versions. It is hoped that the use of time-
skewed data will prevent the versions from failing simultaneously.
i'For example, see [8], pp. 347-348.
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Eachof theseapproachesattemptsto avoidfaultsby operatingsoftwarewith altered
executionconditions.Eachapproachreliesupon circumstanceto changethe conditions.
However,executionconditionscanbechangedeliberately.For example,concurrentsystems
neednot rely on a chancereorderingof events. If reorderingeventsmightallow a second
executionto succeed,thenthe systemshouldenforcea reordering.Changingthe processor
dispatchingalgorithmafterstaterestorationforcesa differentexecutionsequence.Similarly,
skewingtheinputsto theversionsin anN-version system does not require the passage of time.
Inputs can be manipulated algorithmically. Many real-valued quantities have tolerances set by
their specifications, and all values within those tolerances are logically equivalent.
Data diversity is an orthogonal approach to design diversity and a generalization of the
work cited above. A diverse-data system exploits the fact that a slight change in the operating
conditions, particularly the input data, is often sufficient to permit a program to execute correctly.
2. PREVIOUS WORK
Previous work has concentrated on completing the definition of the concepts of data
diversity, developing preliminary performance models, and performing a pilot performance
study. In this section we review the fundamental concepts associated with the technique. More
details can be found in [1, 2].
2.1. Failure Regions
The input data for most programs comes from hyperspaces of high dimension. For
example, a program may read and process a set of twenty floating-point numbers, and so its input
space has twenty dimensions. In many cases the number of dimensions in the space varies
dynamically because the amount of data that a program processes varies for different executions.
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The failure domain of a program is the set of input points that cause program failure [4].
We call a failure domain along with its geometry a failure region. A failure region describes the
distribution of points in the failure domain and determines the effectiveness of data diversity.
The fault tolerance of a system employing data diversity depends upon the ability of the
reexpression algorithm to produce data points that lie outside of a failure region, given an initial
data point that lies within a failure region. The program executes correctly on reexpressed data
points onIy if they lie outside a failure region. If the failure region has a small cross section in
some dimension(s), then reexpression should have a high probability of translating the data point
out of the failure region.
2.2. Data Reexpression
At its simplest, data reexpression is the generation of logically equivalent data sets. Figure
1 illustrates this basic form of data reexpression. An input x given directly to a program Program
produces an output Program (x). Alternatively, a reexpression algorithm Express transforms the
original input x to produce a new input y, where y = Express (x). The input y may contain exactly
the same information as the input x, but in a different form, ory may approximate the information
Execute
x 1 Program
-expression[____ Execute
= Express(xt _[ Program
--------_Program (y )
Figure 1. Re-expression.
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in inputx. The program Program operates on the reexpressed input y to produce Program (y).
Program and Express determine the relationship between Program (x) and Program(y). Data
diversity can tolerate faults when Program (y) is a useful output but Program (x) is not.
Figure 2 identifies two classes of reexpression algorithms. The first class produces elements
in the set I, i.e., elements that should produce Identical outputs, up to numerical error, when
processed by the program. These algorithms are termed exact. The second class yields elements
in the set V, i.e., elements that should produce Valid but not necessarily identical outputs when
processed by the program. These algorithms are termed approximate. Exact algorithms are
desirable from the viewpoint of error detection since they permit error detection by comparison of
outputs that should be the same. Approximate algorithms might be easier to produce, however,
and might have a better chance of a11owing the program to escape a failure region. Exact
reexpression algorithms might also have the defect of preserving precisely those aspects of the
data that cause failure.
Figure 2. Sets in the Output Space for Given Input x.
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Asanexampleof an exact reexpression algorithm, consider a program that processes inputs
representing Cartesian coordinates and that only the points' relative positions are relevant to the
application. A valid reexpression algorithm could translate the coordinate system to a new origin
or rotate the coordinate system about an arbitrary point.
Any mapping of a program's data that preserves the information content of the data is a
valid reexpression algorithm. A simple approximate data reexpression algorithm for a floating-
point quantity might alter its value by a small percentage. The allowable percentage by which
the data value could be altered would be determined by the application. In applications that
process sensor data, for example, the accuracy of the data is often poor and deliberate small
changes are unlikely to affect performance.
The reexpression algorithms discussed above depend on numeric manipulation. It might
appear that many non-numeric applications are not candidates for fault tolerance through data
diversity because numeric reexpression cannot be used. The source program input to a compiler,
for example, is a character string, and any changes to that character string will almost certainly
change the meaning of the program.
Data can take other forms, however, and data diversity can be applied successfully to other
applications. Consider a compiler with a conventional multi-pass organization. Although the
initial representation of a source program is a character string, the program may be represented in
many ways during compilation, for example, as a tree. There are many transformations that can
be applied to a tree that preserve semantics. A compiler employing data diversity for its later
passes could be constructed by executing these later passes on several different copies of the tree
obtained by semantics preserving transformations.
Similarly, the order of storage allocation in an activation record is usually determined by
the programmer's order of declaration. In practice, this order need not be preserved, and a set of
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semanticallyequivalentinternalrepresentationsof a programcanbeobtainedby shufflingthe
orderof variablesin activationrecords.
Combiningtreetransformations,datastoragereordering,andcodestoragereordering,i.e.,
generationof codefor subprogramsin anarbitraryorder,providesconsiderablediversityin the
dataprocessedbylargefractionsof aconventionalcompiler.Theseapproachesto reexpression
areexactin that,althoughthecodegeneratedby thecompilermaybedifferentandthereforenot
amenableto anysimpleselectionalgorithm,theeffectsof theseprogramsshouldbeidentical,
andsosimplevotingcanbeusedforselectionduringexecutionof theprogramsgeneratedbythe
compiler.
In general,areexpressionalgorithmmustbetailoredto theapplicationathand.Producing
a reexpressionalgorithmrequiresacarefulanalysisof thetypeandmagnitudeof reexpression
appropriatefor eachcandidatedatum.Simplerreexpressionalgorithmsaremoredesirablethan
complexonessincetheyarelesslikely tocontaindesignflaws.
2.3. Retry Blocks
A retry block is a modification of the recovery block structure that uses data diversity
instead of design diversity. The concept is illustrated in figure 3. Rather than the multiple
alternate algorithms used in a recovery block, a retry block uses only one algorithm. A retry
block's acceptance test has the same form and purpose as a recovery block's acceptance test. A
retry block executes the single algorithm normally and evaluates the acceptance test. If the
acceptance test passes, the retry block is complete. If the acceptance test fails, the algorithm
executes again after the data has been reexpressed. The system repeats this process until it
violates a deadline or produces a satisfactory output.
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Figure 3: Retry Block.
2.4. N-Copy Programming
An N-copy system is similar to an N-version system but uses data diversity instead of
design diversity. The concept is illustrated in figure 4. N copies of a program execute in parallel;
•, each on a set of data produced by reexpression. The system selects the output to be used by an
enhanced voting scheme.
Voting in an N-copy system is not necessarily straightforward. If the reexpression
algorithm is exact, so that all copies should generate identical outputs, then a conventional
majority vote can be used. However, if the reexpression algorithm is approximate, the copies
could produce different but acceptable outputs. This is likely to occur near boundaries in the
output space. In that case, a simple majority may not exist and the selection process is more
involved. If a particular output occurs more than once, then it might be selected. If more than
one output occurs more than once or no output occurs more than once, then selection might have
to involve an arbitrary choice.
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Figure 4: N-Copy Programming.
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ABSTRACT
We have proposed previously an approach to software fault tolerance based on diversity in
the data space; a technique we term data diversity. In a fault-tolerant system employing data
diversity, the same software is executed on several set of points in the data space, each of which
should produce the same (or simply related) output. Error detection in data diversity is achieved
by observing unexpected differences between the outputs of the software on the different data
points. This approach to error detection can be employed in software testing as well as fault
tolerance, and an important question in both applications is the error detection performance of
data diversity. We report in this paper on a study in which several pieces of commercial
software were obtained and into which faults were injected. These faulty programs were tested
using data diversity for error detection. The results of this study show that data diversity can be
an effective error detection technique.
Subject Index:
Fault-tolerant software, software reliability, design diversity, data diversity.
tSponsored in part by NASA grant NAG_I-I 123-FDP.
1. INTRODUCTION
Error detection is the determination that the output of a software system is
unacceptable to its application, i.e., the software is not in compliance with its
specification. Clearly, error detection is a critical element of both software testing and
software fault tolerance. In software testing, for example, if a test input has been created
that causes a fault to manifest itself, this will be of little value unless the erroneous
software operation can be detected. Similarly, it is not possible to mask the effects of a
fault during execution, and thereby tolerate it, if the erroneous software operation is not
detected. In some systems, detection of errors during operation rather than fault masking
is the only goal [1].
Most existing approaches to software fault tolerance are based on the notion of
design diversity [2]. These approaches employ some form of software redundancy, and
depend for their operation upon differences in the various redundant designs. In the N-
version approach to software fault tolerance, for example, independent implementations
of the software are prepared [2, 3]. Although various error detection mechanisms are
employed in such systems, an unexpected difference in the outputs of these different
implementations is the primary mechanism for error detection.
In testing software systems, many different forms of error detection are used
including replication checks, reversal checks, timing checks, and acceptability checks.
The approach to error detection in which the output of a software system is desk checked
by a human is actually a replication check. Similarly, human examination of the output
to make sure that it "looks right" is actually an informal acceptability check. Many
checking techniques are actually applications of design diversity.
We have proposed previously an approach to software fault tolerance based on
diversity in the data space; a technique we term data diversity [4]. In contrast to systems
employing design diversity, a system employing data diversity executes the same
software on several different (but related) sets of points in the data space. If no fault
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manifests itself, each input data set should produce the same (or simply related) output,
and a decision algorithm is employed to determine system output. As with design
diversity, it is an unexpected difference in the outputs that signals an error in a data-
diverse system. Where there is such a difference, at least one of the executions of the
software must have involved the manifestation of a fault. Error detection is followed in a
fault-tolerant system by the selection of a suitable system output by a decision algorithm.
In direct analogy to the N-version [3] and recovery block [5] strategies of design
diversity, the decision algorithm in a data-diverse system uses a voter or an acceptance
test. Data diversity was shown to provide a useful degree of software fault tolerance in a
pilot study [6].
The fact that data diversity supports error detection is what permits its use in
software fault tolerance. However, this ability to detect errors suggests that data
diversity can be employed in software testing also. In practice, what is required in both
cases is for errors to be detected with probability one when they occur and with
probability zero otherwise. Not detecting an error when it occurs is potentially
catastrophic in a fault-tolerant system. Signalling an error when none has occurred is
also serious in a fault-tolerant system since this also could lead to failure. Not detecting
an error that occurs when testing is less serious. Provided the fault responsible for the
undetected error subsequently causes another error that is detected, the presence of the
fault will be revealed. At test time, the important thing is that the errors produced by a
given fault have non-zero probabilities of manifestation and of detection. The larger the
probabilities the better, but non-zero probabilities ensure that the probability of finding
the fault can be made as close to one as desired by increasing the number of tests.
During testing, false error signals lead to wasted human effort.
The performance of data diversity as an aid to testing and as a technique for fault
tolerance hinges on its error detection performance. As part of a long-term research
project on software dependability, we are assessing the performance of various aspects of
data diversity. In this paper we report on a study of its effectiveness in error detection.
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We have performed an experiment in which the ability of a data-diverse system to detect
the effects of injected faults was determined. In the next section, we describe the
concepts of data diversity and the mechanisms of error detection in more detail. In
section 3 we review the experiment that was performed and in section 4 we present the
results of the experiment. Section 5 contains our conclusions.
2. ERROR DETECTION AND DATA DIVERSITY
The idea of using data diversity as a technique for achieving software fault tolerance
was based on two observations. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that software tends to
fail on special input cases and unusual combinations of events, and second, in many
cases, software is a many-to-one mapping. Every programmer is familiar, for example,
with the situation in which a program fails because of the incorrect processing of
unexpected or obscure data cases. Similarly, programmers are aware that the exact order
of the data read by a program is frequently irrelevant.
The first observation leads to the idea that software would not fail because of a
specific special case if the special case were avoided, and the second observation
suggests that the special case might be avoided by using a different input data set.
Clearly, this different data has to be chosen so that an acceptable output is produced. A
fault-tolerant software structure called an N-copy system [6] that is designed to take
advantage of these ideas is shown in Figure 1.
The process of deriving input data sets that are equivalent to the original yet
different in some way is termed data reexpression. There are two forms of data
reexpression - exact and approximate. Exact data reexpression takes the supplied input
data set and produces an alternative input data set that will produce either the same
output as the original (perhaps up to the limits of numeric accuracy) or an output that is
simply related to the original. An example of exact reexpression for a sort function is a
random permutation of the input. Clearly the reexpressed input is different from the
original input yet should produce identical output. Another example of exact
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Copy 1
Copy 2
Copy N
Decision _ Output
Function
Figure 1 - N-Copy System Structure
reexpression for a sort function is to subtract each input data value from a value larger
than all the input data values. Again, the reexpressed input data set is different from the
original but the output will be different also. However, the output is simply related to the
original and the original output is easily recovered.
Approximate data reexpression produces an alternative input data set that will
produce an output acceptable to the application but possibly not the same nor simply
related to that produced by the original data set. An example is the introduction of a low
intensity noise term into the sensor values used by a control system. This should have
little or no impact on the application since sensor data is usually of limited accuracy.
However, the reexpressed data might avoid a failure arising from a special case in the
data, such as a division by zero resulting from the subtraction of two identical data
values.
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Clearly, data reexpressionalgorithms are application-dependent.There is no
general rule that permits reexpressionalgorithms to be derived for all applications,
althoughthiscanbedonein somespecialcases(see[7], for example). Our experienceto
date is that data reexpressionalgorithms exist for a surprisingly wide range of
applications[8]. The efficacy of datareexpressionis an importantfactor in the success
of data diversity. It is data reexpressionthat yields the multiple data sets which
ultimately leadto theunexpecteddifferencein theoutputsandtherebyto errordetection.
In summary,error detectionusing datadiversity involves executionof the same
softwarewith different datasetswherethedifferentdatasetsshouldproduceidenticalor
related outputs. The different data setsare producedby deliberatemanipulation in a
processcalled reexpression.An error is signalled,andhencethemanifestationof afault
observed,if thereis anunexpecteddifferencein the outputsfrom the variousexecutions
of thesoftware. A potentially valuable benefit of detecting errors at test time in this way
is that it permits automation of error detection in much the same way as comparison
checking does [9, 10]. This facilitates automation of the whole test process. An
automated test system employing data diversity is shown in Figure 2.
3. EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENT
3.1. Overview
The overall goal of this study was to assess the error detection performance of data
diversity. Clearly, an analytic approach in which quantifiable characteristics of a
software system are used to predict error detection performance would be ideal.
However, such an approach is infeasible in general, and we resorted to an experimental
approach in which we measured the ability of data diversity to detect errors in sample
pro_ams containing known faults. Informally, the approach was to execute samples of
commercial software in an N-copy structure with input data taken from the appropriate
operational distribution.
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Figure 2 - Automated Test System Using Data Diversity
An experimental assessment of this type yields the most useful results when it is
based on production software with faults left undetected by the development process.
Statistically valid general results are obtained when large numbers of faults covering the
known spectrum of fault types can be studied. Unless a large number of programs with a
wide range of characteristics and a large number of faults of various types can be studied,
the observed behavior has little statistically predictive meaning. Merely observing the
performance of one or a small number of what would amount to randomly selected
programs with essentially random faults does not necessarily lead to any useful general
indication of the error detection performance of data diversity. Issues that would remain
include the relevance of the results to other faults and fault types, the applicability of the
results to software for different application areas, the effect of the skills of the
programmers involved and their backgrounds, the effect of the specific data reexpression
algorithm used, the effect of the software development environment, etc.
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The size of the experimental study that the above implies is beyond our resources.
Also, unfortunately t the production software that was available for study contained no
known flaws. To mitigate the effect of the inevitable resource limitation and to obtain
more than anecdotal evidence of performance, we chose to perform an experiment in
which we constrained most of the independent variables in the experiment. That is, we
fixed most of the factors that could influence the results and varied one factor completely
and another somewhat. Thus our results are conditional on the values of the fixed factors
but complete for one variable and indicative for the other. Specifically, we focused on a
small number of samples of software written in C that were written by the same
programming organization and that come from the same application domain. The
domain used was geometric calculations associated with maritime navigation.
The study was performed in two phases. In the first phase, we explored the effects
of a set of different fault types using fault injection. This study was complete in that all
possible faults of certain types were generated and the resulting programs tested. The
goal was to acquire information about the performance of data diversity for all possible
instances of a set of fault types in a program. For example, each arithmetic operator in a
given test program was systematically changed to every other possible arithmetic
operator. This was repeated for all the arithmetic operators in the program and the
resulting series of programs containing injected faults, or mutants [11], were tested. The
same procedure was followed in phase one for all the relational operators and all the
logical operators in the available test programs. Since all the arithmetic, logical, and
relational operators were changed and each was changed into all possible alternative
operators, this phase of the experiment provides a general indication of the ability of data
diversity to detect faults characterized by the incorrect use of these operator types.
This kind of systematic fault injection can only be done for small test programs
since the resulting number of mutant programs is very large and grows rapidly with the
size of the initial test program. We generated all possible mutants in certain classes for
t Or fortunately, depending on your viewpoint.
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two small programs. Each mutant was executed with realistic inputs using data diversity
for error detection. Some of the mutants were benign, i.e., the change to the original
program did not cause a fault, and others did not fail on every test case. The original
software was used as an oracle to detect the cases where an error occurred, and hence
when data diversity should have detected the error.
In the second phase of the study, we sought information on the effect of program
size. The central question was whether the performance observed in the first phase was
likely to scale up to larger programs. Again, resources were limited and only a single
larger program was studied. For that program, we generated a random sample of the
mutants since generating and testing all possible mutants was infeasible.
In both phases of the study each mutant was tested many times but the entire test
process itself was also repeated many times. This was to obtain some indication of the
variance in the observed performance. Testing a mutant with a single set of test cases
reveals a certain performance level but this observation is a random sample subject to
statistical variance. Repeating the test process many times with different test data each
time gave insight into this variance which proved to be quite wide.
3.2. Subject Programs
The programs used in this study were supplied by Sperry Marine, Inc., of
Charlottesville, Va. Sperry Marine manufactures computerized maritime electronic
systems. The two programs used in the first phase of the study compute heading and
distance from a ship's present position to its desired destination. Both present position
and desired destination are supplied as latitude/longitude pairs. The outputs are the
heading that must be steered and the distance to the destination in nautical miles. The
first of the two test programs computes the great-circle course and the second computes
the rhumb-line course. The great-circle course is that which minimizes the distance
traveled between two points. Following a great-circle route requires constant adjustment
of the heading. The rhumb-line course is the course that maintains a constant heading.
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Although the traveled distanceis longer, the ability to steer a fixed heading is a
considerablebenefit.
The secondphaseof thestudyuseda programthatcomputesthe orbital positionof
a satellite in the Global Positioning Satellite System (GPSS). The GPSSis used in
navigationsystemsto determinethe locationof anobserver. Theorbital position that is
computedis the locationof the satelliteat somespecifiedtime in a Euclideanframe of
referencebasedon the center of the Earth. The computationsare basedon orbital
parameterinformation for a particularreferencetime that includesthe inclinationof the
orbit abovetheequatorialplane,theorientationof the orbit relativeto the zeromeridian,
and a large number of data elementsused in correcting anomaliesto increasethe
accuracyof thefinal positionestimate.
3.3. Reexpression Algorithms
In phaseone,threereexpressionalgorithmswereused. The first dependsuponthe
fact that the output of the two programswas a courseheadingand distancewith no
dependenceon the actual values of latitude and longitude that were input. The
reexpressionalgorithmrotatedtheinput points aroundtheEarth by anarbitraryamount.
Essentiallythis amountsto changingthe longitude but fixing the latitude. Clearly, this
shouldhavenoeffecton theoutputandsothis is anexactreexpressionalgorithm.
The second reexpression algorithm was approximate. The supplied
latitude/longitudepairs were modified by adding a small random offset to each. The
resulting courses and headingsproduced should be very similar, and this required
similarity wasusedastheerrorindicator.
The third reexpressionalgorithm was also approximate. It took the supplied
latitude/qongitudepairsandgeneratedinputsthat shouldproducealmostidenticaloutputs
by shifting each location by one degreelatitude East and one degree latitude West.
Thesereexpressedlocationsalong with theoriginal dataproducea total of six different
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requiredcourses,each of which shouldhave very similar headingsand distances. By
arrangingthe datasetsin anappropriateway, the outputwas forced to beorderedand
this requiredorderingwasusedastheerrorindicator.
In the secondphaseof the experiment,four reexpressionalgorithmswere used.
Threeof the four wereexactand one wasapproximate. In the first exact reexpression
algorithm the inclination of the satellite'sorbit with respectto the equatorialplane (an
input) wasreversed. The effect of this reexpressionon the output shouldbe to reverse
the signof theoutput z coordinate. The second and third reexpressions were similar but
involved the orientation of the orbit to the zero meridian (another input). Finally, the
approximate reexpression algorithm perturbed the inclination of the orbit and its
orientation to the zero meridian by a small random amount. The effects of these changes
on the individual Euclidean coordinates are complex but the distance of the satellite from
the center of the Earth should be virtually unchanged. An unexpected change in this
distance was used as the error indicator.
3.4. Experimental Procedure
In the first phase of the study, each of the arithmetic operators (+,-, x, /), the
relational operators (<, <, =, >, >, _), and the logical operators (and, or) were changed
into every each other operator in the set. Thus a single + operator generated three
mutants with the + operator replaced by -, x, and / respectively. Some of the resulting
mutants failed to compile and were discarded.
In the second phase of the study, operators were selected at random for mutation
and the change made was selected at random from the available changes. The total
number of mutants generated this way is a very small fraction of the possible mutants for
the program. For each of the test programs used in the study the numbers of each type of
mutant that survived compilation are shown in Table 1. Table 1 also shows the size of
each test program in lines where lines are non-comment source lines of code.
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Program 1 Program 2 Program 3
Lines 34 38 977
Arithmetic 48 45 5 (Fixed)
Relational 25 40 5 (Fixed)
Logical 1 3 0
Table 1 - Numbers Of Mutants and Program Sizes
The error detection performance of data diversity was determined for each mutant.
This was done by executing the mutant with test data in an N-copy software structure and
comparing its error detection performance with that of the original program acting as an
oracle. This process was repeated for each available reexpression algorithm. In phase
one, the exact reexpression algorithm (rotation about the Earth) was parameterized by the
amount of rotation. The resulting N-copy system was executed with N equal to 32, i.e.,
the mutant was executed separately with the original data rotated by each of 32 different
amounts. Error detection then amounted to checking for any unexpected difference in
the 32 different output which should have all been the same.
The general form of the test harness used to evaluate the mutant programs is shown
in Figure 3. The purpose of the comparators in the test harness is to determine whether
there was any error to detect and to identify false alarms. Although the mutants
contained faults, it is not necessarily the case that the fault would manifest itself on each
test. Similarly, an error detected by the N-copy system did not mean there was an error.
For each mutant, a set of 100 test cases was executed by the N-copy system and the
oracle, and the error detection performance measured by comparing the number of times
the N-copy system detected an error to the number of times the oracle detected an error.
Finally, this whole process was then repeated 200 times in order to get some information
about how the data diverse system's error detection performance varied. During the
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Figure 3 - Evaluation Test Harness
execution of these 200 replicates, the best, worse, and average detection rates for the
data-diverse error detector were determined.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1. Phase One - Maritime Course Computation
Too many mutants were generated and tested in phase one to permit the results for
each mutant to be included in this paper. We have selected from the phase one results
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the data for those mutants with the best and the worse error detection performance for
each reexpression algorithm. We define best and worst here to be the highest and lowest
average detection rate, averaged over all 200 replicates. For the first reexpression
algorithm, the best and the worst were the same since this reexpression algorithm
performed similarly on each replicate. Tables 2 and 3 show the results of testing the
arithmetic mutants, and Tables 4 and 5 show the results of testing the relational mutants.
In each of these tables, entries expressed as ratios show the number of test cases in which
the N-copy system detected an error over the number of test cases in which an error
occurred. Thus, for example, in Table 2 the maximum data for reexpression algorithm 2
and mutant 11 (center of the table) is 28/40 meaning that of all the replicates that were
run, the best detection rate observed for that mutant and reexpression algorithm was 28
detected out of 40 that occurred. Recall that in each replicate 100 tests were run and so
the mutant actually failed on 40 out of the 100 tests. A table entry of "NA" means that
Mutant 2
(- _+)
Mutant 10
(x-_-)
Mutant 11
(x-_+)
Mutant 13
(--_+)
Mutant 15
(--_x)
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Maxim um
Minimum
Average
Reexpression
Algorithm I
4O/40
40/40
1.000
40/40
40/40
1.000
40/40
40/40
1.000
40/40
40/40
1.000
40/40
39/40
0.999
Reexpression
Algorithm 2
6/40
0/40
0.046
38/40
20/40
0.762
28/40
11/40
0.472
28/40
11/40
0.465
14/40
1/40
0.183
Reexpression
Algorithm 3
40/40
38/40
0.993
40/40
37/40
0.995
4O/40
37/40
0.995
40/40
37/40
0.994
19/40
4/40
0.226
Table 2 - Great Circle Computation, Arithmetic Mutants
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Reexpression Reexpression Reexpression
Algorithm I Algorithm 2 Algorithm 3
Maximum 48/48 13/13 1/10
Mutant 1 Minimum 48/48 6/10 0/17
(- 4 x) Average 1.000 0.876 0.003
Maximum 48/48 2/7 4/18
Mutant 2 Minimum 48/48 0/13 0/5
(- 4 +) Average 1.000 0.054 0.034
Maximum 100/100 28/99 100/100
Mutant 5 Minimum 100/100 0/17 88/100
(+ 4-4 x) Average 1.000 0.183 0.941
Maximum 62/62 3/3 1/11
Mutant 19 Minimum 62/62 3/6 0/9
(- 4 +) Average 1.000 0.893 0.002
Maximum 100/100 80/100 100/100
Mutant 36 Minimum 100/100 54/100 97/100
(/4 x) Average 1.000 0.696 0.997
Table 3 - Rhumb Line Computation, Arithmetic Mutants
Mutant 21
(< 4 >)
Mutant 22
(<4=)
Mutant 24
(<4>)
Mutant 25
(< -->_)
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Reexpression
Algorithm 1
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Reexpression
Algorithm 2
5/40
O/40
0.047
4/18
0/21
0.042
..... 5/46
0/40
0.047
4/19
0/19
0.044
Reexpression
Algorithm 3
6/40
0/40
0.036
3/17
0/22
0.039
6/40
0/40
0.036
5/23
0/19
0.039
Table 4 - Great Circle Computation, Relational Mutants
-A14-
Reexpression Reexpression Reexpression
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2 Algorithm 3
Maximum 20/20 3/3 NA
Mutant 2 Minimum 20/20 0/1 NA
(= _ >) Average 1.000 0.438 NA
Maximum 40/40 35/40 1/40
Mutant 4 Minimum 35/40 19/40 0/40
(= _ _>) Average 0.973 0.688 0.0004
Mutant 16
(> _ <)
Mutant 18
(< _ =)
Mutant 39
(< --> >)
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Average
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
40/40
35/40
0.973
8/39
0/40
0.085
5/16
0/17
0.089
30/35
12/29
0.655
4/40
0/40
0.019
2/13
0/21
0.021
1/32
0/37
0.001
Table 5 - Rhumb Line Computation, Relational Mutants
for the data produced by that reexpression algorithm, the particular mutant never failed.
The mutations used to produce the mutant programs are shown in each table in the
leftmost column beneath the mutant number.
Only a single logical operator was present in each of the great circle and rhumb line
programs, and the single mutant generated from each did not fail in any of the tests
executed.
False alarms, i.e., signaling an error when none was present, occurred very rarely,
and the rate was directly determined by the tolerance used in the comparison. Inevitable
differences in numeric results sometimes triggered false alarms because the differences
were somewhat larger than expected yet still acceptable.
The results of phase one suggest that error detection by data diversity was very
effective for arithmetic mutants (Tables 2 and 3). There were considerable differences
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between the reexpression algorithms, and, in some cases, differences between the
mutants for a given reexpression algorithm. The detection of errors caused by faults in
relational operators (Tables 4 and 5) was less effective but the average over all replicates
was still nonzero indicating that the fault would eventually be detected, at least during
testing. Again there was considerable difference between the reexpression algorithms.
4.2. Phase Two - GPSS Orbit Computation
In phase two, a total of five arithmetic mutants and five relational mutants were
generated that survived compilation. There were no logical operators in the program.
The results of the testing of the arithmetic mutants is shown in Table 6.
Reexpression Reexpression Reexpression Reexpression
Algorithm I Algorithm 2 Algorithm 3 Algorithm 4
Maximum 100/100 0/100 100/1])0 4/100
Mutant 1 Minimum 98/100 0/100 100/100 0/100
(+ ---)x) Average 0.996 0.000 1.000 0.017
Maximum 100/100 0/100 100/100 4/100
Mutant 2 Minimum 99/100 0/100 100/100 0/100
(/--) ×) Average 0.994 0.000 1.000 0.020
Maximum 100/100 100/100 100/100 32/100
Mutant 3 Minimum 97/100 100/100 100/100 19/100
(× --->/) Average 0.990 1.000 1.000 0.259
Maximum 35/35 0/43 38/38 2/46
Mutant 4 Minimum 28/29 0/43 38/38 0/43
(× ---)/) Average 0.986 0.000 1.000 0.0094
Maximum 100/100 0/100 100/100 3/100
Mutant 5 Minimum 99/100 0/100 100/100 0/100
(× --_ +) Average 0.997 0.000 1.000 0.0140
Table 6 - GPSS Computation, Arithmetic Mutants
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Each mutant that was generated by changing a relational operator either failed on
every test case that was run or did not fail at all. For those that failed on every test case,
none of the failures was detected by the N-copy structure. Investigation of this situation
revealed that these mutants were generating output that was wildly incorrect and doing so
no matter how the data was reexpressed. The test harness was modified to include a
simple acceptability check, i.e., that the satellite was actually above the surface of the
Earth, and this acceptability test failed on every occasion. Thus although the N-copy
system was defeated, the software had failed so badly that a trivial additional check
detected all of the errors.
The error detection performance observed on the larger program used in phase two
was similar to that observed during phase one. The arithmetic mutations caused errors
that stood a high chance of being detected but there were considerable differences
between reexpression algorithms. The performance on relational mutations, i.e., no
detection of programs failing every test case, was surprising and suggests that data
diversity might be more useful in detecting errors caused by more obscure faults.
Combining data diversity with other error detection techniques, such as the
reasonableness check that we used, seems to be a fruitful approach.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We conclude from this study that data diversity has considerable potential for error
detection but it is quite variable in its performance. This is confirmation of the same
conclusion reached in the pilot study [6]. In the present study, however, we see that the
variation occurs across different fault classes and across reexpression algorithms. The
fact that for many mutants the N-copy systems were able to detect the errors generated
with very high probability is encouraging.
The variation in performance can be reduced if more than one reexpression
algorithm is used, and by using multiple instantiations of the same reexpression
algorithm if it is parameterized. It also appears to be beneficial to combine the method
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with other error detection methods. Selection of methods that can be easily automated,
such as reasonableness checks, is particularly appropriate. The combined error detection
performance of a set of methods would be a profitable area to study.
It is important to note the conclusions we have reached is based on a very small-
scale study with many experimental variables deliberately fixed. We cannot extrapolate
our results to other application domains or in any other way. General results about the
performance of data diversity await further experimentation by ourselves and others.
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ABSTRACT
The control laws for some critical systems are expressed as sets of differential equations. The task
of the software is to implement a solution to the control laws. Even though automated aids are
heavily used in such implementations, there is no guarantee as to the correctness or reliability of
the resulting software. This paper explores a first step in the use of data redundancy to tolerate
design faults in differential equation solvers. We distinguish two cases. In the first case, we are
interested primarily in the applicability of data redundancy to a wide class of differential equa-
tions. In the second case, we are interested in circumstances under which it is reasonable to use
an independence model to build highly reliable solvers from moderately reliable components.
The paper indicates general tradeoffs and assumptions that underlie this application of the tech-
nique and provides data from a pilot study.
Keywords: Data Diversity, Data Redundancy, Design Redundancy, Software Fault Tolerance,
Software Reliability.
t This work supported in part by NASA grant NAG_1-1123-FDP and NSF grant CCR-9010036.
1. INTRODUCTION
Critical software-based systems continue to be proposed and built. Common examples
include medical life support and monitoring equipment, avionics and spacecraft control software,
and nuclear power plant shutdown control software. Often these systems implement various con-
trol laws expressed as differential equations, and so we must be concerned with the reliability of
these implementations.* In this paper we first combine the fault tolerance technique of data redun-
dancy [1, 2, 3, 4] (also called data diversity) with the rich theory of differential equations to
develop general approaches for tolerating design faults in differential equation solvers. We then
elaborate additional conditions under which it is justifiable to use independence assumptions to
achieve very high reliability levels for such systems.
The most widely studied fault tolerance techniques are based on design redundancy, exam-
ples of which are N-version programming [i 1] and recovery blocks [27]. In N-version program-
ming, a vote on intermediate and/or final results of the redundant implementations is used to
determine system output. In a recovery block, an acceptance test on intermediate and/or final
values is used to evaluate the results of successive alternate implementations. In addition to being
used for fault tolerance, the design redundant structures are also used via comparison checking or
back-to-back testing [7, 10, 28, 30] for software fault removal. Design redundant systems suffer
from a variety of difficulties [8, 9, 13, 17, 18]; see [15] for a thorough review. The most serious of
these problems is modeling the effect of component failure on the failure characteristics of the
entire system; the basic difficulty is that the models from the analogous hardware systems simply
do not apply [13]. We return to the issue of modeling in section 2.
An alternate approach to the detection and tolerance of software faults, and the approach that
is the topic of this paper, is data redundancy. The difference between design and data redundancy
can be summarized as follows: design redundancy employs related designs on the same input;
data redundancy employs the same design on related inputs. Data redundant systems are econom-
ically attractive and potentially very effective [2].
The basic framework for data redundancy is as follows: In a data redundant system, only
t Ccmcern about correct operation is not limited to reliability; see, for example, [19].
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Fig. 1: N-Copy Programming.
one implementation of a program is developed from the specification, t A given input, x, is used to
derive N alternate inputs, x l, x2 ..... XN, that satisfy some application dependent equivalence
property. The program, P, is run on the alternate inputs, xi, to produce P(xl), P(x2) ..... P(XN).
A decision algorithm is employed to evaluate the (possibly different) outputs, P(xi). The manner
in which alternate inputs are derived is the fundamental determinant of the success of data redun-
dancy.
Data redundant program structures parallel the design redundant structures. N-Copy Pro-
gramming is based on N-Version programming, except that the vote is used to select from the out-
puts produced by the execution of the same implementation on a set of alternate inputs. The retry
block is based on the recovery block, except that when the acceptance test fails, the same imple-
mentation is retried with an alternate input. Fig. 1 illustrates the semantics of N-Copy program-
ming; fig. 2 illustrates the semantics of the retry block.
In this paper, we discuss the application of data redundancy to differential equation solvers.
In section 2, we address the modeling problem: we outline the requirements on data redundant
systems such that the one is able to meaningfully predict the reliability of a system based on the
reliability of the system's components. In section 3, we discuss, first by way of example and then
with a general theory, the way in which data redundancy can be applied to differential equation
"t"We adopt the following simple lint general model to focus the presentation: During testing or during operation, the progrm'n in question,
denoted P, executes on a specific input, x, to produce an outpuL P(x).
- B2-
System _[ Execute __JRe-express]
Input -[Algorithm- [Data]
System_Invoke
Output- _-_ -Backup
Fig. 2: Retry Block.
solvers. In section 4, we join sections 2 and 3 by recasting the example of section 3 so that the
reliability of the solver can be probabilistically guaranteed. In section 5, we give results from a
pilot study that illustrates the behavior of the example. Section 6 contains conclusions.
2. THE MODELING PROBLEM
In hardware systems, it is well understood how to construct systems of high reliability from
components of moderate reliability [29]. For example, in N-Modular Redundant (NMR) hardware
systems, N replicates of a hardware module are supplied so that the failures of some subset can be
tolerated. Similarly, in standby sparing systems, replicates of a component can take over in the
event that the primary component fails. The key factor for the success of structures such as NMR
and standby sparing is that it is reasonable to model component failures as independent events; the
probability that two components fail simultaneously is assumed to be the product of the individual
failure probabilities. It is indeed fortunate that hardware models can take advantage of the
independence assumption; if the assumption did not apply, actual hardware reliability would be
substantially lower.
N-version programming parallels the hardware NMR structure. Similarly, the recovery block
parallels the hardware standby sparing model. Unfortunately, as has been shown empirically [18],
the independence model is not appropriate for N-version programming or the recovery block. The
difficulty is that the probability of failure for a randomly chosen software component is a function
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of the input beingprocessed;someinputsaresimply morelikely to triggerdesignfaults thanoth-
ers. Models which takeaccountof this dependence,suchasthe multi-version model developed
by EckhardtandLee [13], generally(althoughnot always)predict substantiallylower reliabilities.
Worse,suchmodelsyield averageresultsthat areparameterizedby anunknownfailure intensity
distribution. In general,thesemodelsarenotusefulfor predictingthepropertiesof a specificsys-
tem.
In [2] it wasshownthattheEckhardtandLee modelcould beadaptedto describetheperfor-
manceof dataredundancyin generalapplications.Thus,in theabsenceof additionalinformation,
the independencemodelis not appropriate for general data redundancy applications. In [2], it was
further shown that the program structure employed, either a retry block or an N-Copy system, was
much less important to the performance of data redundancy than the ability of the re-expression
algorithm to exit the failure region.
However, we now tum to a basic point of this paper: it is possible, for certain applications,
to employ data redundancy in such a way that it is reasonable to apply an independence model. In
such cases, it is possible to take software components of modest reliability and construct a system
of substantially higher reliability. Below we enumerate methods by which one can justify the use
of an independence model. We highlight the assumptions underlying these methods. It is impor-
tant to recognize that we are not supplying a panacea for the problem of software reliability; our
claim is only that, with care, the independence model can reasonably be applied to tolerate design
fault in an important set of applications. This paper considers the independence model in the dif-
ferential equations domain; other researchers have applied random algorithms in various other
areas [5, 20].
2.1. Data Redundancy And The Independence Model
How is the independence model made applicable? Suppose that we are given a usage distri-
bution over the domain of interest. _ Through life testing [23, 26], it is possible to bound the failure
probability due to a design fault on a randomly chosen input. That is, if an input is randomly
selected from the domain according to the usage distribution, then, with confidence C, we can be
-t For the following analysis, it is not necessary that the postulated usage distribution precisely match the actual usage distribution. However,
as will become apparent in Seclion 5, selecting inputs from a significandy different distribution does affect performance.
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surethat the probability of failure doesnot exceedsomefixed value, say p. Random selection
yields the independence property; the probability that two randomly selected inputs will simul-
taneously cause failure is p 2.
It may not appear that we have made much progress. Although it is true that by randomly
selecting inputs we can be sure that the different invocations of the software are failing indepen-
dently, we must be able to use the outputs produced by the randomly selected inputs. After all, if
we are given an input x, we are required to produce the program output P(x), not P(y), for some
random y. However, in certain cases, it turns out that we can use additional information to relate a
random input, y, back to the original input, x. Below we outline two methods for achieving this
goal. _ Both techniques are applicable to the differential equations arena.
Single Input Method
One basic method is to select random parameters that map x to a single arbitrary y in the
domain, and then use those same parameters to map P(y) back to P(x). Ifx is a vector instead of
a scalar, it is important that the parameters represent a sufficiently rich transformation. For exam-
ple, if x is a point in R 3 then the transformation needs to able to map x to some three dimensional
subregion of R 3. Clearly, a two parameter transformation is insufficient to guarantee the
equivalent of random selection in R 3.
Multiple Input Method
Another basic method is to choose a random input y 0 independently of the given input x, and
then choose a set of other inputs, Yl, Y2 .... , YN. The criterion for selection of the Yi is that the
multiple outputs P(Yi) can be combined in such a way that, in the absence of failure, there is a
direct relation to the output P(x). Le., we need a function f (), such that, in the absence of
failures, f(P(Yo), P(Yl) ..... P(YN)) = P(x). This powerful technique has been explored by Lipton
[20] for polynomials and by Ammann and Knight [3, 4] for simple trigonometric functions. We
review these applications below.
t We note that [5] exploits this idea in a slighdy different manner in the design of program checkers.
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Identity Function
The first examplewe give for thesingle input methodis very simple, andis of explanatory
valueonly. The exampleappearsin [20]. Supposethat we wish to reliably computetheidentity
function, f (x) = x, and that all that we have available is a (possibly) faulty implementation, P,
with the property that P(x) actually differs from x with probability p on randomly chosen x. If we
compute P(x+r) for randomly chosen r, we can be sure that the probability that P will fail on both
input x and input x+r is p 2. Note that, with probability l-p, we can recover f (x) from P (x +r) by
subtracting r.
Polynomials
We now address a more substantive example. A comprehensive treatment of this example
may be found in [20]. Suppose that we wish to multiply pairs of numbers more reliably than we
are assured for a given implementation of multiplication. Such an application might arise, for
example, in cryptography, where it is necessary to perform modulo arithmetic on numbers with
hundreds of digits. Consider the computation A x B. Select two random values, X1 and Y1 and
compute X2 =A-X1 and Y2 =A-Y1. We may rewrite the product A xB as
X1 x Y1 +X1 x Y2 +X2 x Y1 +X2 x Y2. Note that we have rewritten the product of A and B as
the sum of four other products. Due to independent selection, we may be sure that failure on each
of the four resultant multiplications is independent of failure on the multiplication of A and B. In
his analysis in [20], Lipton shows that the independence property can be maintained when the
transition is made from algebra to typical machine representations. In addition, Lipton extends
the example to demonstrate reliable computation of polynomials.
Sine Function
Our final example is repeated from [3]. It is a data redundant computation of the sine func-
tion. Assume we have an implementation of the sine function that is known to work over a large
percentage of it inputs; the failure probability for the sine function on a randomly chosen input, x,
is p, where p < < 1. To compute sin(x), we use the two trigonometric identities
sin(a +b) = sin(a)cos(b) + cos(a)sin(b)
cos(a) = sin(r_/2-a)
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to rewrite
sin(x) = sin(a)sin(x/2-b ) + sin(r_/2-a)sin(b)
in which a and b are any two real numbers such that a+b = x. Suppose that sin(x) is computed
using three independent decompositions for x obtained by using three different values each for a
and b, and that a simple majority voter selects the output. Using the worst case assumption that
all incorrect answers appear identical to the voter, a conservative estimate for the probability of
computing an incorrect value for sin(x) is on the order of 48p 2.
Series Expansions
If we are content to describe a function with a series expansion over either polynomials or
sines and cosines, we can use the techniques above to calculate arbitrary functions with very high
reliability given components of moderate reliability and assumptions about the correctness of the
basic arithmetic operations.
3. APPLYING DATA REDUNDANCY TO DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
In this section, we wish to elaborate the general ways in which the underlying theory of dif-
ferential equations may be exploited in data redundant implementations of differential equation
solvers. We begin with a simple example of a harmonic oscillator, and then proceed to more gen-
eral theory based on Lie symmetries. In this section, we concentrate exclusively on the differen-
tial equations; in the next section we tie the results reported below to the independence property
described in the previous section.
3.1. An Example
lOll]ix] 1- , x(0) -- x0 -- ix20dt [x2 0 2
We wish to compute x (T).
We wish to exploit the symmetry of the given o.d.e, by letting the group G = R2xR + act on
the data to be fed into the o.d.e, solver used to provide the computed value. The ultimate objec-
tive is to improve the reliability of the accepted computed value.
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The groupG will be tied into the ode solver which when passed parameter values [o_,13,y]
G will be referred to as the [tx, 13,7]-solver. This will be done in such a fashion that, corresponding
to the group identity [0,0,1] _ G, the [0,0,1J-solver is the solver for the above given harmonic
oscillator. The main objective is to produce multiple evaluations for x (T), each obtained by a
(small) finite number of calls to the [0,0,1]-solver and any [tx,13,y]-solver on appropriate argu-
ments.
Consider the initial-value problem
d Iyl ] [_ o_ 13+1][2yl] , y(0)=y0 = I_l °]d_ : =Y 13-1 o_ 2 2o
Denote its solution value at c as P [tx,13,y](_,y °) which we identify with the value returned by an
exact [ct, 13,y]-solver.
Proposition For each [tx, 13,7] _ R =xR + and _ a R,
e [0,0,1]("/_,P [tx,13,y](-a,P [0,0,1](T,P [0,0,1](-'y_,P [e_,13,7](a,x0))))) = x (T),
for every e_,13,y and t_. If all return the approximate same value of x (T) then we have increased
confidence that P [0,0,1] is working for t0 = 0 , x0on0 < t < T.
It is easy to show that the [ct,13,y]-solver can move any initial-data point in the (t, x)-space
to any other as long as x is not zero.
3.2. General Theory
Assume that the equations have been cast into the first order system form of the the initial-
value problem
;c = f (t, x) , X(to) = Xo
where x is a n-vector state variable in R n and, for simplicity, assume that fis a smooth function of
its argument in RxR n. The classical theory of differential equations ensures the existence of a
unique solution x = qf(t, to, Xo) satisfying the differential equation and the initial condition that
rlf(to, to, x0) = x0. (The domain and properties of this general solution rl I are discussed in
[21].) For each choice of input data (to, x0) a good differential equation solver implemented
correctly provides a discrete approximation to the resultant trajectory (t, x(t)) in RxR n with
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x(t) = rlf(t, to, x0).
The idea of data redundancy discussed earlier in this paper leads to questions of the Lie
theory type concerning symmetries of differential equations. This is best explained in terms of the
diagram of fig.3. (Also see fig.Z)
Extending the notation - scheme of Example 3.1, we call the implementation of a numerical
integration algorithm applied to a differential equation given by f a [f ]-solver. Hence, if all is
working well, if the [/]-solver is given input data (to, x0) it produces the numerical approximation
to the trajectory (t, rl(t, to, x0)) on the interval to <t <tl and in particular computes (tl, Xl)
where xl = rlf(tl, to, x0).
The basic data re-expression question raised is: Can this numerical solution be obtained by
feeding the [f]-solver some other input data (To, 2'0)? Motivation for the question might arise
from some doubt about the validity of the result returned by the [f]-solver in response to the origi-
nal input (to, x0). Once obtained, (To, 2"0) would be used to run the [f]-solver a second time to
get 0"1,2"1) and the results would then be transformed back to provide the solution to the original
problem. As did Sophus Lie, who used another ordinary differential equation to transform the ori-
ginal problem but for the purpose of finding a change of coordinates that would reduce the dimen-
sion of the original equation as a step in finding the general solution to the original equation (see
[/]-solver _ fra, 2x)
$
I [ [-g]-solver
[/]-solver _ (t 1, Xl)
fro, 2"0)
[gl-solver [
(to, x0)
Fig. 3: Data Re-Expression Via Lie Symmetries.
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[6, 25]), we chooseto transformtheinitial databy meansof anotherdifferential equation. The
equation dzm = g (z), this time is autonomous, i.e., independent of c with z a variable in R n+l.
do
The invariance requirement, which is that with Ct"o, _o) = rig( _, O, to, xo), (t, rlf(t, T o, "Xo))
transform back via rlg(-o, 0, •, .) to give the solution (t, fir(t, to, x0)) to the original problem
then is equivalent to the statement that the diagram in fig. 3 be commutative. Due to space limita-
tions we omit details but it can be shown that this commutativity is equivalent to the imposition of
the partial differential equation
=0
where _ = f® I and the bracket [ , ] is the Jacobi bracket given by the formula
[hl,h2] = (Jh2)hl - (Jhl)h2
0h----L/isthe Jacobian matrix of any vector field h. Here, the superscript i on h
in which (Jh )ij = Oxj
denotes the ith coordinate of h. A solution g is called an infinitesimal generator of a one-
parameter family of symmetries off, or just an infinitesimal generator or just generator for f.
Having cast the basic re-expression question into the language of Lie theory we can now
make some general statements: The infinitesimal generators of f constitute a Lie algebra relative
to the Jacobi bracket product, generally infinite dimensional. The infinite dimensionality is good
news for it indicates that the potential for data re-expression is extensive. (Since g is autonomous
the inverse transform is accomplished by application of the [-g]-solver).
Of course [h, h ] = 0 for every vector field h, hence _ is always an infinitesimal generator
for f. Therefore g = _provides trivial re-expression, namely, the restarting of the [/]-solver using
the most recently computed value of (t, x) computed as initial input. In particular it provides the
simple test wherein one restarts the [/]-solver with initial data (t l, x 1) where x l is the value
returned for fir(t1, to, Xo) and compares it with the value X'o returned for rlf(to, tl, xl). If
I 20 - xo [ is not small the approximate solution for fir(t, to, xo) produced by the W-solver is
rendered suspect. (We assume that the solver is written so that it computes backward as well as
forward trajectories.)
Fortunately the entire Lie algebra of symmetries off need not be computed. (It can be con-
structed from rl f but this construction is only of theoretical interest.) Once a single generator g for
f is found its [g]-solver with input data (to, Xo) produces a one parameter family,
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f/0, g0)g = rig( a, 0, to, x0), of re-expressed values of the initial data. If two or more generators
are found in addition to _then others can easily be obtained via bracket products and linear combi-
nations since they generate a subalgebra. Of course the more generators one finds the greater is
the capability for doing the re-expression. Even though it is possible to transform the initial data
to arbitrary values in specific instances, in general, this is not the case.
For special differential equations, namely those arising from a single scalar higher order dif-
ferential equation methods are available for computing infinitesimal generators and the Lie alge-
bras obtained are finite dimensional. (see [6, 25].)
In applications a finite and perhaps small number of generators might prove adequate. One
might restrict the choice to a parameterized family as illustrated by Example 3.1 of this article
where
f(t'Xl,X2) = Xl , ga_y(X, Xl,X2) = ff.Xl+([3+l)x 2
+ 1)xi +
Although it is a simple matter to write down the exact solutions to the differential equations
given by these vector fields, since they are linear, such generally is not the case. We include the
following theorem which gives an algebraic criterion for commutativity within a class of non-
linear differential equations whose members are not readily solvable except by numerical
methods.
Theorem
Let A and ,_ be real n×n matrices having the same eigenvalues, i.e., they have the same
characteristic polynomial. Select any vectors L, 4, _ in R n.
Then the vector fields
f (x) = e_rxA ; , _f(X) = e
commute if
(k=l, 2, • • • ,n-l).
Proof. In [21] it is shown that for any n×n matrix A, and ; in R n,
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etA_ = [_, A_, • • • , An-l_][y 0 , By ° , • • • , Bn-ly°]-tetny°
for some n×n real matrix B and y0 in R n depending on only the characteristic polynomial of A,
i.e., on the eigenvalues of A with their multiplicities. Consequently, in the notation of the theorem
being proved,
for some y
pute
f (x) = [_ , A _ , • • • , A n-l _][y ° , By 0 , • • • , Bn-lyO]-l e_'rxByO
f(X) = [_,A_, " " • ,._n-l_][y 0 , By 0 , " " " , Bn-lyO]-l e_fxByO
f
o in R n and nxn matrix B. Letting f (x) denote the Jacobian matrix off (x) we corn-
• . . , An-l_][y ° , By ° ,
p
f (x)_f(x) = [_, A_, • . . , Bn-ly°]-lBekrxByO_. T
, Bn-lyO]-leffXByO.['_,,_, "," • ,An-l_]tv0 ,By O, • . .
N
Therefore for f'(x)_(x) = f (x)f (x) it is sufficient that
[_ , A _ , • • • , A n-l _][y° , By° , . . .
[_, A_," • . , An-l_l[y 0 , By 0 ,
This equation can be rewritten as
d etA;_T[_ _ . . .
dt ' '
which is equivalent to
d
,_n-l_] = "_ etX_ T[_ , A_ ' . . . ,An_l_ ]
etAA _ T[_ ' ,_, . . . , ,_n-l_] = etX_T[; , A ; , • • • , A n-l _] .
But writing out the exponential functions in series shows that the above equation is equivalent to
the matrix equations
Aka; .Tg, • • •, = A;, • • ', A"-I;]
k = 0, 1, 2, • • • ). Since A and A" are assumed to have the same characteristic polynomial we
we see by the Cayley-Hamihon theorem that if the equations hold for k + 1 = 1, 2, • • , n-1
then they will automatically hold for the remaining values of k. This concludes the proof.
In concluding this section we mention some related work published by one of the authors
(Lukes [22]) which takes an arbitrary linear controllable differential equation and asks: What
linear input, output and feedback filters can one wrap around the dynamical system in a manner
that leaves the overall input-output characteristics invariant but alters the inputs that the original
dynamical system would experience? There it was shown that each controllable system admits its
own Lie group of such filters. Moreover the group can be computed. This group expresses the
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original system's potential for fault avoidance. The present article continues a variation of that
theme which started in [2] where it was discussed in the context of general programs. The
hypothesis being proposed suggests that there is a potential for designing software and perhaps
some hardware in a manner where the parameters enter in such a fashion that at least certain
classes of faults could be reasonably tolerated using ideas discussed in other sections of this paper.
4. RELIABILITY GUARANTEES
We now rework the example given in the previous section to show how one can go about
developing a system that offers probabilistic guarantees of reliability. We show that it is possible
to employ data redundancy in such a way so as to justify applying the independence model dis-
cussed earlier. It should be noted that many of the re-expression techniques cited below are stan-
dard practice in the numerical methods area [14]. The focus here is to use these techniques in
such a way so as to allow the use of the independence model described in Section 2.
4.1. The Oscillator Revisited
The differential equation describing the oscillator accepts the following transformation:
[.'yl]2 = [-_%1 _+l][:xl]0_ 2
I.e., the transform in o_ and 13maps solutions of the differential equation to other solutions of the
differential equation. Suppose we are given input x. We can choose random values for cx and 13
and derive a new input y. After we compute P(y), we can, in the absence of failure, use the
inverse transformation to retrieve the desired quantity P(x). It is important to note that the distri-
bution for y is not the usage distribution. As will be shown in the pilot study in Section 5, this
seemingly unimportant detail destroys the ability of the model from Section 2 to accurately
predict the failure probability of a data redundant system. However we can avoid the problem by
selecting y from the usage distribution and then deriving the quantities c_ and [3 that map x to y.
With this mode of operation, the independence model does apply.
A standard technique that applies to linear equations is superposition. We may exploit
superposition for fault tolerance in such a way that the independence model applies. However,
some care is required. Consider an input x. Suppose that we break x into two inputs y and z
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where x = y+z. If we choose y from the usage distribution and then compute z = x-y, we are
justified in using the independence model. If we instead compute y uniformly from the interval
[0, x], the independence assumption no longer applies. Again, the difference between these two
approaches is illustrated in the pilot study reported in Section 5.
As a final note, we have only addressed the problem of transforming x. We note that we can
handle the time parameter t in a number of standard ways. The most straight forward is to note
that the we may choose another time interval tl at random, and then derive t 2 = t-t1. We can
then compute P (P (X, tl),t2) = P (x,t) Another standard technique for dealing with faults that man-
ifest themselves in specific values of the t parameter is to adjust the step size At.
4.2. General Theory
The theory in Section 3 explains how to derive various differential equations to transform the
initial input. In general, the reliability of the solver implementing these alternate differential
equations may be suspect. However, in some cases these differential equations are sufficiently
simple that they correspond to simple algebraic manipulations. For differential equations of
sufficient interest, i.e. differential equations in critical control systems, it is not unreasonable to
expect that the Lie symmetries be known. And since any Lie group may be reparameterized, it
may be reasonable to rework the equations so that "standard" transforms, such as scaling, rota-
tion, and translation are admitted. The complete details of such an approach constitute an impor-
tant open question.
5. PILOT STUDY
In this section we describe a pilot study that investigates the behavior of various data redun-
dancy strategies applied to a differential equation solver.
5.1. Design
We consider an implementation of a specific differential equation solver, namely a Runge-
Kutta 4th Order solver [14]. We note that the selection of any other standard solver would have
been appropriate. We investigate the behavior of the solver on the harmonic oscillator example
presented in Section 3.1.
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Theparameterwevaryover thecourseof the experiment is the data re-expression algorithm.
We explore 5 different re-expression algorithms; 2 are based on the independence model dis-
cussed in section 2, and the other 3 are not. By including both types of strategies, the study illus-
trates the general properties of independence model discussed previously.
The first strategy, labeled '1' in subsequent figures, was outlined in the example in Section
3.1. The program P, along with three parameters c_, 13and y, is used in the re-expression algo-
rithm. The second two strategies are based on the observation that the two parameter transform
described in Section 4.1
[y: ] = [_ o__1 13+ 1 ] [x: ]
maps solutions of the oscillator onto other solutions. In the strategy labeled '2', the parameters c_
and 13are chosen at random; the alternate input y is then derived from the given transformation. In
the strategy labeled '3', the alternate input y is chosen at random, and ot and 13are derived accord-
ing to the transformation. We will see that this seemingly slight difference between the two
methods can have a dramatic impact on performance. The fourth and fifth strategies are based on
the fact that for linear systems, sums and scalar multiples of solutions are also solutions. We
derive two inputs from the original input; run the solver on both, and then sum the two results. In
the strategy labeled '4', the alternate inputs are derived by choosing two scale factors, o_ and 13at
random. In the strategy labeled '5', one alternate input is chosen at random, and the other is
derived by subtracting it from the original input. Again, we will see that this seemingly slight
difference between the two methods can have a dramatic impact on performance.
For this experiment, the focus is on examining the properties of various data re-expression
algorithms with respect to the independence model. For that reason, we have chosen not to apply
the model to a large or representative variety of software faults. If we are able to select inputs
apparently at random according to the usage distribution, then the characteristics of the particular
software faults are irrelevant to the performance of the data redundant system. If the inputs are
not randomly selected, the details of the various faults are then vitally important. The goal of the
experiment here is to highlight this distinction, not fully evaluate the consequences of failing to
meet requirements of the independence model.
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For the reasons outline above, the solver was seeded with a single generic fault that caused
failure if the tolerance between the two components of the solution dropped below a certain thres-
hold. Such a fault could arise in a variety of locations in typical implementation; for example,
such a fault could arise in a relative error test for convergence. In addition, the tolerance level
provided a convenient handle to adjust the failure rate of the fault to any desired level. In short,
the generic fault is ideal for the experiment described here. For experiments designed to evaluate
general data re-expression algorithms on arbitrary faults, a method such as mutation analysis [12]
or fault-based testing [24] would be appropriate, t
5.2. Results
We now present the results of evaluating the 5 data redundant strategies described above.
The particular mechanism that we use for analysis is the retry block with a single retry. In fig. 4,
0. Original Program: P[0,0,1] (x,t)
1. P [a, _,'tl (..-)
2. P[a,13,11 (x,t), random oq 13
3. P[a, I3,U (x,t), random x
4. P[o,o,1] (Xl,t) + P[o,o,1] (x2,t), random or, 13
5. P[o,o,1] (Xl,t) + P[o,o,1] (x2,t), random Xl
Component
Fig. 4. Observed Component Failure Probabilities
1(_-5 l(_--n 1(_-3 1(_-2 10-1 _
Failure Probability
_"See, for example, [16].
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we present the observed component failure probabilities for each of the five strategies.
Confidenceboundsarenotreportedon thefigurebecausethebullets thatrepresenteachdatapoint
encompassthe 90% confidencebound. The strategylabeled '0' correspondsto the differential
equation solver operating on the original input without any application of data redundancy.
Severalpointsin fig. 4 warrantnotice. First, for strategies'1', '4', and '5', thefailure probability
of the componentexceedsthatof the original program. This is becausemultiple executionsof P
are required for each of these strategies. Second, for strategy '3', the failure probability of the
component matches that of the original program. This is reasonable, since only a single execution
of P is required, and that execution occurs on an input chosen according to the usage distribution.
Finally, the failure probability for the component in strategy '2' is substantially lower than for the
original program. How is this possible? It turns out that the data re-expression .algorithm for stra-
tegy '2' happens to map to inputs in a region of the domain with a lower failure probability for the
given fault. This is entirely a function of the particular fault; for other faults the situation could
easily be reversed. Thus the relatively low value of the failure probability for strategy '2' should
not be viewed as a desirable result.
1. P la, P._,I ("')
2. Pla,[3,1] (x,t), random o_,
3. P[a,$,ll (x,t), random x
4. Pt0.0,11 (xl,t) + P[0.0,1l (x2,t), random ct, 13
5. Pt0,0.1l (X1 ,t) + PI0,0,11 (Xz,t), random xt
System
1(_-5 10-1
e
x
x
xl e
10 -4 10-3 1J-2
Failure Probability
Fig. 5. Single Retry System Failure Probabilities: Observed (O) and Independence Model (x)
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In fig. 5, we present failure probabilities for systems built from the components enumerated
in fig. 4. Each system is a retry block in which component '0' executes first. If component '0'
fails, then a data redundant component executes. Entries in fig. 5 are the probabilities that both of
these computations fail coincidentally; e.g. we define this event as system failure. Entries marked
by a circle are the observed system failure probabilities. A 90% confidence bound is placed
around each observation. Entries marked by a cross are the failure probabilities predicted by an
independence model. These values are simply the product of the corresponding entries from fig.
4.
There are several important points to note about fig. 5. First, the failure properties of the two
strategies ('3' and '5') that explicitly selected alternate inputs according to the usage distribution
agree with the independence model. Second, for the strategies in which we selected random
parameters instead of random inputs ('2' and '4'), note that the independence model clearly does
not apply. In the case of strategy '4', the performance falls short of the independence model. In
the case of strategy '2', the performance in much better; again the reader is cautioned that this is
purely an artifact of the fault under study. Other faults would produce other behavior.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have outlined a general theory for applying data redundancy to differential equation
solvers. On cost considerations alone, these should be considered serious candidates for fault-
tolerance. They are also very strong candidates for error detection at test time.
We have given a simple example of such an application. The example demonstrates that the
overhead to apply such techniques is not prohibitive, and that many degrees of freedom are possi-
ble in specifying alternate data. We have evaluated the example experimentally under a variety of
data re-expression algorithms. The pilot study illustrates the areas of concern in implementing a
data redundant system under an independent failures model.
Design redundant systems cannot guarantee high system reliability based on moderate com-
ponent reliability. In general, data redundant systems suffer from the same limitation. However,
specific applications of data redundancy can employ random algorithms to achieve guarantees of
very high system reliability. We have taken a first step in applying random algorithms to the dif-
ferential equations area.
-B18-
REFERENCES
[1] P.E. Ammann, "Data Redundancy for the Detection and Tolerance of Software Faults", Proceedings
interface '90, East Lansing, MI, May, 1990.
[2] P.E. Ammann, "Data Diversity: An Approach To Software Fault Tolerance", PhD Dissertation,
University of Virginia, January, 1988.
[3] P.E. Ammann and J.C. Knight, "Data Diversity: An Approach To Software Fault Tolerance", Digest
FTCS-17: Seventeenth International Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing, Pittsburgh, PA, July,
1987, pp. 122-126.
[4] P.E. Ammann and J.C. Knight, "Data Diversity: An Approach To Software Fault Tolerance", IEEE
Transactions On Computers, Vol. 37, No. 4, April, 1988.
[5] M. Blumen and S. Kannan, "Program Correctness Checking ... and the Design of Programs That
Check Their Work", Technical Report TR-88-013, International Computer Science Institute, Berke-
ley, CA, December, 1988.
[6] G.W. Blumen and S. Kumei, Symmetries and Differential Equations, Springer-Verlag, New York:
1989.
[7] S.S. Brilliant, "Testing Software Using Multiple Versions", PhD Dissertation, University of Virginia,
January, 1988.
[8] S.S. Brilliant, J.C. Knight, and N.G. Leveson, "The Consistent Comparison Problem in N-Version
Software", IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, Vol. 15, No. 11, November, 1989.
[9] S.S. Brilliant, J.C. Knight, and N.G. Leveson, "Analysis of Faults in an N-Version Software Experi-
ment", IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, Vol. 16, No. 2, February, 1990.
[10] S.S. Brilliant, J.C. Knight, and P.E. Ammann, "On The Performance of Software Testing Using Mul-
tiple Versions", Digest FTCS-20: Twentieth International Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing,
Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK, June, 1990.
[11] L. Chen and A. Avizienis, "N-Version Progr_ming: A Fault-Tolerance Approach to Reliability of
Software Operation", Digest FTCS-8: Eighth International Symposium on Fault Tolerant Comput-
ing, Tolouse, France, June, 1978, pp. 3-9.
[12] R. DeMillo, R.L Lipton, and F.G. Sayward, "Hints on Test Data Selection: Help For the Practicing
Programmer' ', IEEE Computer, April, 1978.
[13] D.E. Eckhardt and L.D. Lee "A Theoretical Basis For The Analysis Of Multiversion Software Subject
To Coincident Errors", IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, Vol. SE-11, No. 12, December
1985.
[14] R.W. Hombeck, Numerical Methods, Quantum Publishers, New York: 1975.
[15] J.C. Knight and P.E. Ammann, "Design Fault Tolerance", to appear in Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, 1990.
[16] J.C. Knight and P.E. Ammann, "On The Effectiveness of Data Diversity As An Error Detection
Mechanism", submitted to FTCS 21.
[17] J.C. Knight and N.G. Leveson, "An Empirical Study of Failure Probabilities in Multi-Version
Software", Digest FTCS-16: Proc. 16th Int. Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing, Vienna, Aus-
tria, July, 1986, pp 165-170.
[18] J.C. Knight and N.G. Leveson, "An Experimental Evaluation of the Assumption of Independence in
Multiversion Programming", IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, Vol. SE-12, No. 1, Janu-
ary 1986.
[19] N.G. Leveson and P.R. Harvey, "Analyzing Software Safety", IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, Vol. SE-9, No. 5, September 1983.
[20] R.J. Lipton, "New Directions in Testing", Proceedings Interface '90, East Lansing, MI, May, 1990.
- BI9 -
[21 ] D.L. Lukes, Differential Equations; Classical to Controlled, Academic Press, New York. 1982.
[22] D.L. Lukes, "Lie Groups Underlying Fault Avoidance in Dynamical Control Systems", Proceedings
of the 1988 International Conference on Advances in Communication and Control, VoI.II, pp. 841-
848, Baton Rouge, LA, October 1988.
[23] D.R. Miller, "The Role of Statistical Modeling and Inference in Software Quality Assurance", In
Software Certification, ed. B. de Neumann, Elsevier Applied Science, London, UK, 1989.
[24] L.J. Morell, "A Theory of Fault-Based Testing", IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, Vol.
16, No. 8, August 1990.
[25] P.J. Olver, Application of Lie Groups to Differential Equations, Springer-Verlag, New York: 1986.
[26] D.L. Pamas, J van Schouwen and S.P. Kwan, "Evaluation of Safety-Critical Software", Communica-
tions of the ACM, Vol. 33, No.6, June, 1990.
[27] B. Randell, "System Structure for Software Fault Tolerance", IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, Vol. SE-1, No. 2, June 1975.
[28] F. Saglietti and W. Ehrenberger, "Software Diversity - Some Considerations About Its Benefits And
Its Limitations", Digest of Papers: SAFECOMP '86, 5th International Workshop on Achieving Safe
Real-Time Computer Systems, France, October, 1986.
[29] D.P. Siewiorek and R.S. Swarz, The Theory and Practice bf Reliable System Design, Digital Press,
Bedford, MA, USA, 1982.
[30] M.A. Vouk, M.L. Helsabeck, K.C. Tai, and D.F. McAllister, "On Testing of Functionally Equivalent
Components of Fault-Tolerant Software", Proc. COMPSAC 86, 1986, pp. 414-419.
- B20 -
1-3
4-5*
6
7-8
9- 10
11
12
DISTRIBUTION LIST
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23665
Attention: Dr. D. E. Eckhardt, Jr., ISD
M/S 478
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Scientific and Technical Information Facility
P. O. Box 8757
Baltimore/Washington International Airport
Baltimore, MD 21240
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Acquisition Division
Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23665
Attention: Mr. Richard J. Siebels
Grants Officer, M/S 126
E. H. Pancake, Clark Hall
J. C. Knight, CS
A. K. Jones, CS
SEAS Preaward Administration Files
*One reproducible copy
JO#3910:ph
